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This paper examines the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on China’s income inequality. Two measures of inequality 
are used in this study: inequality within the urban community and 
the urban-rural income gap. Data covering 25 provinces from 
1990 to 2006 are analyzed using the following techniques: fixed 
effects, random effects, and system GMM. This study finds that: 
(1) FDI significantly increases urban inequality and the distributional 
effect of FDI on urban inequality is robust in all the techniques 
and different measures of FDI used. (2) there is no evidence that 
FDI widens income disparity between urban and rural areas.
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I. Introduction
How globalization affects income inequality has long been a subject 
of debate and intellectual discussions. The debate on the distributional 
impact of globalization often polarizes into two opposite strands of 
thought. One strand argues that globalization leads to more uneven 
income inequality because the benefits from globalization are not 
evenly shared among the citizens of a country. There are clear losers in 
relative and possibly even absolute terms, although globalization in 
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general, may improve overall incomes (IMF 2007). Trade increases 
differentials in returns to education and skills but globalization 
marginalizes certain groups of people or geographic regions, and trade 
liberalization is often not complemented by development of adequate 
institutions and governance (Hurrell and Woods 2000). 
The other strand of thought argues that globalization helps reduce 
inequality (Srinivasan and Bhagwati 1999; Ben-David 1993). According to 
this view, the integration of the world economy through globalization 
may raise income inequality in the earlier stages of development but it 
eventually declines in the long-run. In addition, Sala-i-Martin (2002a, 
2002b) and Lindert and Williamson (2001) find that no significant 
relationship exists between globalization and income inequality. Moreover, 
Jaumotte et al. (2008) and Reuveny and Li (2003) find that the effects 
of trade and financial globalization are different. While trade globalization 
reduces income inequality, financial globalization increases income 
inequality.
This article focuses on one aspect of globalization, the distributional 
impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on income inequality. Spe- 
cifically it investigates the inflow of FDI and how it is associated with 
the rising income inequality in post-reform China. 
The main reason for studying this problem is that, compared with 
the distributional impact of trade globalization, only a relatively small 
number of studies empirically have investigated the effect of FDI on 
income inequality in host countries, though almost all of the existing 
studies arrive at quite a consistent conclusion that FDI has invariably 
led to uneven income distribution in the host countries. If we say that 
trade globalization affects income inequality by influencing skilled or 
unskilled labor through imports or exports, then FDI can promote 
income inequality by raising relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled 
labor. According to the conventional wisdom, FDI enhances the premium 
on skilled labor by bringing in skill-biased technology (Aitken et al. 
1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Graham and Wada 2000). In an 
economy with institutional segmentation in the labor market and high 
labor mobility costs, FDI could increase relative wages of skilled labor 
even without bringing in skill-biased technology (Zhao 2001). Aside 
from the technology effect of FDI, capital accumulation accompanied by 
FDI can also affect income inequality in the host countries. Thus, it is 
by all means interesting and necessary to see whether the distributional 
effect of FDI reported in previous studies could stand up to a more 
careful examination. 
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In China, the rapid increase in the inflow of FDI has not only 
stimulated many theoretical and empirical studies, but has also 
generated much debate on the impact of FDI on China’s economy 
among economists. However, studies on the impact of FDI are mainly 
focused on its growth impact and there have been fewer studies 
investigating the distributional effect of FDI. Almost all of the existing 
studies, however, agree that FDI has led to more uneven income 
distribution in post-reform China (Wan et al. 2007; Wu 2000; Xu and 
Zou 2000; Zhang and Zhang 2003; Zhao 2001; Sun 1998). Some of 
the studies performed empirical work using decomposition method 
(Wan et al. 2007; Zhang and Zhang 2003). 
This study aims to contribute to existing literature by examining the 
impact of FDI on income inequality. My empirical work differs from 
previous studies in three ways. First, I study the effect of inward FDI 
on income inequality not only within the urban areas but also between 
the urban and rural areas using a set of provincial data. Second, in 
examining the impact of FDI on within-urban inequality, I measured 
income inequality from a comprehensive Gini coefficient data set rather 
than GDP. Third, I utilized the regression method rather than the 
decomposition method; the existing literature relates FDI to income 
inequality by applying decomposition technique developed by Shorrocks 
(1999); while the decomposition technique has the advantage of 
quantifying the contribution of FDI, it cannot identify its significance 
when FDI and other factors entered together in an inequality equation. 
In this paper, I examined whether the impact of FDI on income 
inequality is significant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sketches 
some theoretical analyses on the distributional effect of FDI; Section 3 
presents a background on China’s FDI and income inequality; Section 4 
shows the analytical framework and empirical specifications; Section 5 
presents the results of the empirical analysis; and finally conclusions 
and discussions are presented in Section 6.
II. Nexus of FDI and Income Inequality
The effects of FDI on income inequality are highly debatable. 
Generally speaking, there are two hypotheses about the impact of FDI, 
namely the ‘developmental/modernization’ hypothesis and the ‘world 
system/dependency’ hypothesis. The two hypotheses give quite different 
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views about the role of FDI in the host countries’ economic develop- 
ment. 
The modernization theorists argue that FDI provides the host 
economies with capital, promotes technology transfer, and modernizes 
their management skills and corporate governance. These, in turn, 
raise labor productivity and accelerate economic growth (Markusen and 
Venables 1999; Choi 1998; Blomstrom and Kokko 1996; Hanad and 
Harrison 1993). They argue that FDI reduce income inequality via the 
Kuznets effect wherein income inequality increases at first as per capita 
income grows but declines later once a certain level of development is 
reached. 
During the early stages of development, a developing economy is 
typically characterized by: an increase in the share of the population 
involved in a narrow modern high-income sector of the economy; an 
increase in the income gap between the high-income and low-income 
sectors, and an increase in inequality within each sector. These 
characteristics directly result in the increase of overall inequality (Tsai 
1995; Adelman and Robinson 1989). 
In the later stages, as more output is produced and enough labor 
has been transferred from the traditional agriculture sector to the 
modern industrial sector, the surplus labor in agriculture gradually 
disappears and the marginal product of the agriculture labor will be 
raised to the level of the industrial labor. With the increase in real 
labor income, economic growth and the likely rise of political 
democracy therefore result in more equal income distribution (Tsai 
1995; Fei and Ranis 1964; Lenski 1966).
According to the modernization hypothesis, the presence rather than 
the origin of the investment is considered important. This means that 
capital, whether foreign or domestic, fosters growth and its benefits 
eventually spread throughout the whole economy. Therefore, even if 
FDI initially stimulates growth only in some leading sectors and regions, 
provides benefits to some skilled elites, the growth in the leading sectors 
and regions could facilitate more equal income distribution within a 
country in the long run (Tsai 1995). 
To most modernization theorists, factors such as the types of economic 
system and development strategy are the truly crucial determinants of 
income distribution. As long as the influences of these factors are 
properly taken into account, the difference in the amount of foreign 
capital should not cause any significant variance in income inequality  
(Tsai 1995). 
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This view is also supported by Dollar and Kraay (2000). They argue 
that economic growth helps raise the income of the poor more than 
that of the rich, taking FDI as a useful tool in reducing poverty (Stiglitz 
1998). Empirically, this kind of view relates economic growth and 
income inequality (or FDI and economic growth), and does not relate 
FDI and income inequality directly. 
Contrary to the modernization hypothesis, the dependency hypothesis 
admits that FDI possibly has a short-term positive impact of the flow 
on economic growth but it contends that FDI has more long-term 
negative impacts on economic growth, as reflected in the negative 
correlation between the inflow of FDI and growth rate (Lheem and Guo 
2004). 
In the short run, an increase in FDI enables higher investment and 
consumption and thus contributes to economic growth. However, as 
FDI accumulates and foreign projects take hold, there will be adverse 
effects on the rest of the economy that reduce economic growth. This is 
due to the intervening mechanisms of dependency, in particular, 
‘decapitalization’ and ‘disarticulation’ (Lheem and Guo 2004). 
It is also argued that FDI raises income inequality in the host less 
developed countries (LDCs) in several ways. First, the most common 
argument for a negative impact of FDI on income inequality is that FDI 
raises relative wages of skilled labor in a host country by bringing in 
skill-biased technology. Using data from the United States, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, Aitken et al. (1996) find that foreign-owned establishments 
pay higher wages than domestic ones after controlling for other factors. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Graham and Wada (2000) find 
empirical evidence that the growth of FDI is positively correlated with 
relative wages of skilled labor in Mexico.
Second, the capital-intensive techniques used by foreign investors 
promote unemployment among unskilled workers and distort income 
distribution by creating an economy with a small advanced sector and 
a large backward sector (Reuveny and Li 2003; Jenkins 1996; Lall 
1985). 
Third, multinational corporations (MNCs) pay low wages in labor- 
intensive industries such as footwear and clothing and push domestic 
suppliers to follow suit to reduce the MNCs’ purchasing costs (Barnet 
and Cavanagh 1994; Held et al. 1999).
Fourth, FDI creates a new class of ‘labor elites’ in some leading 
sectors. These labor elites earn four to ten times the normal wages and 
other benefits in the comparable domestic sectors and thus raise 
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income inequality (Girling 1973). Furthermore, it has been noted that 
an economic-cum-political ‘triple alliance’ emerges naturally because 
the labor elites, considered as powerful economic players, and the state 
are usually supported by foreign investors (Evans 1979). This economic- 
cum-political alliance then manipulates the exclusive power of the 
nation state to intervene in the market whenever it does not work for 
its interest. The formation of the alliance therefore means that there 
are intrinsic destructive factors in any policy aiming at improving the 
distribution of income. In fact, it could be one of the most fundamental 
sources for persistent income inequality in the LDCs (Tsai 1995). 
Fifth, host LDCs usually impose smaller taxes on foreign investors, and 
this reduces government revenues and eventually, welfare expenditures. 
This, in turn, hurts the poor more than the rich (Hatzius 1997; Human 
Development Report 1999). 
In China, there are also heated debates on the impact of FDI. It has 
been analyzed that FDI stimulated economic growth (Chen et al. 1995; 
Gao and Wang 2003; Sun and Parikh 2001), improved industry 
structure (Jiang 1996; Lu 2000; Zhao 2002), and helped to alleviate 
employment problems (Fu and Balasubramanyam 2005). However, 
recently, skeptical views on foreign investment began to arise in China, 
noting that it has failed to lead to effective technology transfer and 
indigenous innovation capabilities (Wang 2005a; Wang 2005b; Zuo 
2003), and failed to improve the living standards of the people even 
though they increased their outputs. Moreover, some views even claim 
that it is proper to restrict the inflow of foreign direct investment 
because there is no longer a shortage of capital in China (Chinese 
Academy of Social Science 2004; Zuo 2003) and multinational corpora- 
tions are gradually becoming monopolized (Beijing WTO Research Center 
2004; Wang 2005b). In contrast, others claim that China still faces a 
lack of capital and suffers from employment pressure. They say that 
for further institutional and system reform, more foreign capital will be 
advantageous for a substantial period in the future as it serves as an 
externally imposed momentum (China Economic Times 2004. 10. 20).
III. Trend of FDI and Income Inequality in China
A. FDI 
One of the most important features of China’s economic reform is 
the encouragement of foreign investment. Since the late 1970s, China 
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has gradually opened its economy to foreign investors to attract capital 
and advanced technology. Inward FDI in China can be classified into 
four stages (Li and Chang 2004; Wan et al. 2007).
First stage: The period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s is 
considered as the initial stage of the inflow of FDI. This period is 
characterized by setting up new regulations to attract FDI and setting 
up the Special Economic Zones and ‘Open Cities.’ The total FDI flows 
into China in this stage was only U.S.$41 billion.
Second stage: The second stage is from 1985 to 1991. FDI inflows 
increased stably over this period and about 40% of FDI was located in 
Guangdong province. 
Third stage: The third wave occurred in 1992 after the famous ‘Tour 
to the South’ by Deng Xiaoping. FDI accelerated greatly since then and 
became the most important sources of foreign capital inflow. 
Fourth stage: The last stage starts from 2001 after China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). China reduced the tariffs, 
abolished quota and license arrangement, and opened more sectors to 
the foreign investors.
For the three decades since China began to integrate with the global 
economy in 1978, the FDI flows into China have been astonishing. 
From an economy virtually without any foreign investment in the late 
1970s, China has become the largest recipient of FDI among the 
developing countries and globally the second, next only to the United 
States since 1993. 
FDI flows into China during 1979-2008 constitute over 20% of total 
FDI in the developing economies. By 2008, the total FDI received in 
China reached U.S.$755 billion (UNCTAD database, http://stats.unctad. 
org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId＝1254). 
The share of FDI flows in the GDP was almost zero in 1978, rose to 
2.25% in 1992, and then reached its peak in 1994 at 6.04%, and then 
began to fall continuously to 2.63% in 2006. The ratio of FDI stock 
against the GDP increased up to 30% in 2002 but declined slightly 
after then (see Table 1). It seems that while the absolute amount of 
FDI is still increasing, the relative FDI shows a decreasing trend in 
recent period.
A striking feature of inward FDI in China is that coastal provinces 
have attracted more FDI than inland provinces. From 1990-2006, the 
three coastal provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shanghai ranked 
top three, while the three inland provinces, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and 
Guizhou ranked bottom three in terms of the total FDI stock. The top 
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TABLE 1










1979-1984  4.10   4.10 0.23  0.23
1985  1.96   6.06 0.64  1.47
1986  2.24   8.30 0.75  2.04
1987  2.31  10.62 0.71  2.45
1988  3.19  13.81 0.79  2.76
1989  3.39  17.21 0.75  3.19
1990  3.49  20.69 0.89  3.80
1991  4.37  25.06 1.07  4.32
1992 11.01  36.07 2.25  5.75
1993 27.52  63.58 4.49  8.87
1994 33.77  97.35 6.04 12.54
1995 37.52 134.87 5.15 15.10
1996 41.73 176.60 4.87 17.77
1997 45.26 221.85 4.75 20.77
1998 45.46 267.32 4.46 23.89
1999 40.32 307.63 3.72 26.21
2000 40.72 348.35 3.40 27.08
2001 46.88 395.23 3.54 28.04
2002 52.74 447.97 3.63 29.18
2003 53.51 501.48 3.26 29.12
2004 60.63 562.11 3.14 27.87
2005 60.33 622.43 2.69 26.92
2006 69.47 691.90 2.63 26.10
Note: Author’s calculation from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook. 
three provinces alone attracted more than 48% of the total FDI stock 
during the same period.
B. Income Inequality 
It is generally known that China has been achieving an unprecedented 
and impressive growth over the last three decades. The average per 
capita GDP growth rate was 9.9% during the period of 1990-2006 (see 
Table 2). However, the rapid economic growth has produced an income 
inequality rate that is among the fastest in the world. According to the 
data released by National Bureau of Statistics (NBSC), China’s Gini 
coefficient of household income was 0.21 in 1978, but reached 0.465 
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF USED VARIABLES
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GINI 425   0.24  0.05  0.13   0.38
URGAP 425   2.62  0.77  1.14   5.36
FDI 425  17.68 22.64  0.15 105.00
GDPGR 425   9.88  4.54  -6.77  37.75
COAST 425   0.40  0.49  0.00   1.00
EDU 425  90.57  9.24 57.60 103.00
INFL 425 105.48  7.30 96.80 126.90
SOE 425  70.72 11.73 30.57  90.14
EXPORT 425  16.83 18.87  2.24 102.05
AGR 425   7.78  2.74  2.13  15.43
GOV 425  13.46  5.52  4.92  34.81
URBAN 425  31.66 16.21 12.26  85.76
Note: See the appendix for the definitions of the variables.
in 2005, higher than the internationally accepted warning level of 0.4.1 
China is being transformed from a country with high equality in 
income distribution to a country with high inequality.
The widening gap in China’s overall inequality is due to the increase 
in within-urban and within-rural inequalities, and the inequality 
between urban and rural sectors. Studies on China’s inequality using 
the decomposition method show that the urban-rural gap is the main 
driving force behind the increased overall inequality (Tsui 1993; 
Kanbur and Zhang 1999; Shi 2004; Sicular et al. 2007). 
These three inequalities are presented in Table 3. Between 1988 and 
2006, urban income inequality increased by 15 points (from 0.18 to 
0.33). While the share of income of the top quintile in total income 
rose from 26.4% to 38.7%, the bottom quintile’s share dropped from 
14.7% to 8.4%. The middle class (middle three quintiles) also slightly 
suffered with the lapse as its claim dropped by 2.3% (from 58.9% to 
52.9%). 
The widening income gap within the urban region was not evenly 
shared among the provinces. In some provinces, such as Henan, 
1
The Gini coefficient standard was set up as a warning system for the study 
of the wealth inequality by global economists and sociologists. It is a universally 
accepted gauge to measure whether the gap between the rich and poor is 
tolerable. The warning level of the system is 0.4.
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TABLE 3





1988 0.18 2.11 0.30
1989 0.18 2.34 0.30
1990 0.18 2.27 0.31
1991 0.17 2.34 0.31
1992 0.19 2.49 0.31
1993 0.20 2.74 0.32
1994 0.22 2.83 0.33
1995 0.21 2.73 0.34
1996 0.21 2.49 0.32
1997 0.22 2.45 0.33
1998 0.23 2.50 0.34
1999 0.24 2.64 0.34
2000 0.25 2.76 0.35
2001 0.26 2.90 0.36
2002 0.31 3.13 0.37
2003 0.32 3.25 
2004 0.33 3.26 
2005 0.34 3.24 
2006 0.33 3.28 　
Note: The urban Gini coefficient and the urban-rural income gap are author's 
calculation from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook. The urban- 
rural income gap is measured as the urban-rural per capita income ratio. 
The data of rural Gini coefficients are from Li and Yue (2004).
Jiangxi, and Anhui, not much change has been noted. However, the 
Gini coefficient in other provinces increased dramatically. Jiangsu 
province, located in the southeast part of China even increased its Gini 
by more than 18 points, and Guangdong by 15.8 points, Shanghai by 
15.3 points, and Liaoning by 15.1 points (see Table 4). It was found 
that all the sample provinces except Xinjiang raised their Gini during 
the period of 1990-2006. A special case, Xinjiang, located in the 
northwest corner of China, even improved its Gini by 10.3 points.
Increasing income inequality was not only exhibited at the urban 
level, but also between the urban and rural sectors, the largest 
contributor to China’s overall income inequality. The urban-rural 
income ratio increased by 1.2 from 2.11 in 1988 to 3.28 in 2006. 
The urban-rural income differentials decreased slightly between 1994 
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TABLE 4
STATISTICS OF SOME USED VARIABLES BY PROVINCE FOR 
THE PERIOD OF 1990 TO 2006
　
GINI URGAP GDPGR FDI stock
FDI 
stock/GDP







Beijing 0.202 0.093 2.08 1.04  8.18  29.81 29.46
Tianjin 0.241 0.136 2.06 0.76 10.60  28.09 41.44
Shanxi 0.243 0.089 2.58 0.82  8.89   3.88  4.14 
Inner Mongolia 0.246 0.081 2.45 1.09 11.31   5.02  3.65 
Liaoning 0.229 0.151 1.91 0.41  9.09  38.06 19.68 
Jilin 0.237 0.102 2.06 0.92  9.55   5.55  8.25 
Heilongjiang 0.248 0.146 1.92 0.75  8.59   9.04  6.51 
Shanghai 0.224 0.153 1.83 1.12  9.27  60.93 35.68 
Jiangsu 0.247 0.186 1.76 0.61 12.44 113.38 28.11 
Zhejiang 0.229 0.143 1.94 0.42 12.57  44.62 11.94 
Anhui 0.216 0.073 2.85 0.60 10.51   6.69  5.57 
Fujian 0.226 0.091 2.15 0.24 12.47  61.83 49.36 
Jiangxi 0.227 0.073 2.13 0.63 10.31  13.04  9.47 
Shandong 0.221 0.131 2.30 0.35 12.17  62.75 14.97 
Henan 0.233 0.065 2.54 0.57 10.46   9.67  4.60 
Guangdong 0.270 0.158 2.62 0.78 11.20 160.17 52.52 
Guangxi 0.241 0.126 3.40 1.30 11.04   8.51 14.67 
Hainan 0.274 0.137 2.83 0.51 10.11  10.33 75.23 
Sichuan 0.248 0.124 2.99 0.14  9.87  12.11  5.63 
Guizhou 0.244 0.129 4.03 1.79  8.00   0.77  2.26 
Yunnan 0.220 0.134 4.44 2.10  7.95   1.92  2.63
Shaanxi 0.239 0.096 3.38 1.54  8.89   5.82  9.37 
Qinghai 0.251 0.112 3.04 1.10  7.92   0.86  2.35 
Ningxia 0.246 0.110 2.91 0.67  7.86   0.48  3.06 
Xinjiang 0.286 -0.103  3.25 1.38  7.86   0.58  1.40 
Note: See the appendix for the definitions of the variables. These data are from various 
volumes of China statistical yearbook, provincial statistical yearbooks, China 
population statistical yearbook and China's National Bureau of Statistics. X(T )-X (0) 
means the change in the value between 1990 and 2006.
and 1997 but since then, have continually increased to historic high 
levels. The provinces also exhibited a large difference in their urban- 
rural income gap. While the average ratio of urban to rural income was 
1.76 for Jiangsu, 1.83 for Shanghai, 1.91 for Liaoning, and 1.92 for 
Heilongjiang, it was 4.44 for Yunnan, 4.03 for Guizhou, 3.40 for 
Guangxi, and 3.38 for Shaanxi. The correlation between urban-rural 
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TABLE 5
THE CORRELATION MATRIX OF USED VARIABLES
　 GINI URGAP FDI GDPGR COAST EDU INFL SOE
GINI 1.000 　
URGAP 0.289 1.000 
FDI 0.341 -0.187 1.000 
GDPGR 0.130 -0.016 0.056 1.000 
COAST -0.052 -0.500 0.656 0.167 1.000 
EDU 0.440 -0.299 0.349 0.168 0.369 1.000 
INFL -0.398 -0.017 -0.222 0.237 -0.004 -0.247 1.000 
SOE -0.299 0.335 -0.435 -0.230 -0.564 -0.543 0.261 1.000 
EXPORT 0.180 -0.257 0.590 0.140 0.661 0.320 -0.048 -0.622 
AGR -0.139 0.401 -0.472 -0.135 -0.607 -0.509 0.168 0.565 
GOV 0.327 0.570 -0.183 -0.183 -0.422 -0.103 -0.230 0.295 
URBAN 0.126 -0.455 0.342 -0.043 0.452 0.529 -0.052 -0.356 
　 EXPORT AGR GOV URBAN
EXPORT 1.000 
AGR -0.544 1.000 
GOV -0.225 0.276 1.000 
URBAN 0.420 -0.577 0.018 1.000 
Note: See the appendix for the definitions of the variables.
income ratio and urban Gini is 0.289 (see Table 5).
The increase in inequality within rural areas is not large, with only a 
7-point increase between 1988 and 2002. The relatively small increase 
in rural income inequality is the result of the slow growth of rural 
income. Sannong problem (agricultural, rural, and farmers’ problem) is 
a serious topic in nowadays China. To improve the living conditions of 
the farmers, the Chinese government has announced its ‘Number 1 
Document’ since 2004 which includes a set of policies such as 
supporting the development of agricultural production in grain 
producing areas, developing industrial and service industries in rural 
areas, assisting the farmers in moving to the urban, and so on.
From the above analysis about China’s income inequality, it can be 
concluded that there is indeed a rise in the inequality in China’s 
income distribution, whether it is among provinces or groups. However, 
it should be noted that while the general trend in unequal incomes is 
increasing, a noteworthy feature of China’s income distribution is the 
successful decrease in poverty reduction. China’s poverty head count 












RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FDI AND THE URBAN GINI
decreased to 23 million in 2003 from 125 million in 1985.
C. FDI and Income Inequality 
The rapid rise in income inequality in China may be caused by 
many factors. FDI seems to play a certain role when it comes to the 
correlation between FDI and urban Gini in Table 5 (0.341). Figure 1 
plots the relationship between FDI and regional urban income inequality.
The figure shows a positive relationship between FDI and the urban 
Gini coefficient. However, we cannot simply conclude that FDI increases 
income inequality, because once other factors are added, the role of 
FDI may be not significant. Thus, in the next section, I related FDI and 
income inequality using more rigorous empirical work.
IV. Research Design
As mentioned in the first section, I study the impact of FDI on 
China’s income inequality within the urban areas as well as inequality 
between the urban and rural sectors. First, I postulated the following 
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equation model to investigate the role of FDI on urban inequality:
GINIit＝β0＋β1FDIit＋β2GDPGRit＋β3COASTi＋β4INFLit＋β5 SOEit
    ＋β6GOVit＋β7EDUit＋β8URBANit＋β9EXPORTit＋μ i＋ε it       
(1)
In Equation (1), GINIit, the dependent variable, is the commonly used 
Gini coefficient in the urban areas of province i in year t. FDIit, the 
most important factor of this paper, is measured by the ratio of FDI 
stocks to GDP. GDPGRit is the real per capita GDP growth rate, and 
COASTi is the variable relating to geography of province i. This dummy 
variable takes on a value of 1 for 10 provinces or municipalities located 
in the coastal areas,2 and takes on a value of 0 for the remaining 15 
provinces. Inflation rate (INFLit), the size of state sector (SOEit) and 
government spending (GOVit) were included to capture government 
policy. EDUit is the secondary school enrollment rate, as the measure of 
human capital, and urbanization (URBANit) is measured as the 
proportion of nonagricultural population in the total provincial 
population. Another controlled factor is export (EXPORTit), measured as 
the ratio of the volume of export to GDP. For more detailed definitions 
on these variables, please refer to the appendix.
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of two components: μ i 
and εit . μ i represents a province-specific effect, it can be considered as 
the collection of factors that are specific to the province but are not 
included in the explanatory variables (Xit ). Failure to take into account 
these factors may cause an omitted variable bias in the estimation of 
Equation (1). When μ i is correlated with the included explanatory 
variables (Xit), the fixed effects (FE) model is appropriate. 
When μ i is not correlated with Xit, the random effects model becomes 
more appropriate than the FE model. I tested the correlation using the 
Hausman-Wu test.3 Equation (1) also includes the time-varying 
parameters of the measurement error, which are likely to be associated 
with the regressors. 
While time-invariant heterogeneity across provinces can be deleted 
by employing FE model, time-varying parameters are not controlled 
and endogeneity may remain in the model. To control unobserved 
2
It includes Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan.
3
Hausman (1978) constructed a test based on the difference between β RE 
and β FE. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients is not systematic. 
If the difference is large, FE is preferred.
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inter-province or inter-household heterogeneity and the associated 
omitted variable bias, the time-varying parameters of the measurement 
error and the potential endogeneity, the methodology used is the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In applying the GMM 
method, I used as instruments all the explanatory variables except 
COAST and INFL which were considered exogenous in this paper. 
Geography is a purely natural endowment and inflation is seen as 
exogenous because the monetary policy was set by the central banks, 
and therefore, unlikely to be correlated with the province-specific 
time-variant εit (Xu and Zou 2000). The values of the contemporary 
explanatory variables lagged at least four times are used as instruments 
in the equations.
To evaluate whether the GMM model is correctly specified (i.e.,  
whether the instruments used are appropriate), two criteria, the 
Sargan/Hansen test and the AR(2) test, are performed. The Sargan/ 
Hansen test is an over-identifying restriction test. The null hypothesis 
of the Sargan/Hansen test is that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the residuals. Note that the Sargan/Hansen test is 
weak when the instruments are many. This is likely to occur in this 
paper because I used as instruments all the explanatory variables 
except coast and inflation, and the time period is relatively long (1990- 
2006). 
The AR(2) test is the second-order serial correlation test in the first 
differenced residuals. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) test is that 
there is no second-order serial correlation among the differenced 
residuals. This test provides a further check on the specification of the 
GMM model.
To investigate the role of FDI in the widening income disparity 
between the urban and rural sectors, the following equation was 
tested:
  URGAPit＝γ0＋γ1 FDIit＋γ2GDPGRit＋γ3COASTi＋γ4INFLit＋γ5 SOEit 
    ＋γ6 AGRit＋γ7 EDUit＋γ8URBANit＋γ9 EXPORTit＋μ i＋ε it      
(2)
Where URGAPit is the ratio of urban to rural income in province i in 
year t. Here, fiscal expenditure on agriculture (AGRit) is controlled 
instead of total government consumption (GOVit). The definitions of the 
rest are the same as described in Equation (1). 
In estimating Equation (2), I also employed the FE, RE, and the 
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system GMM techniques. In GMM method, the values of the contem- 
porary explanatory variables lagged at least four times, are used as 
instruments in the equations.
A panel data set covering 25 provinces4 over the period of 1990-2006 
is used to estimate the urban Gini and the urban-rural income gap. 
Data used in this paper are from various yearly issues of China 
Statistical Yearbook, China Population Statistical Yearbook, provincial 
statistical yearbooks and China’s National Bureau of Statistics. 
It is noted that all of the independent variables used in this article 
are provincial data, even those used in estimating the urban inequality 
equation. It is more ideal to use the urban-level data in estimating the 
determinants of urban inequality. However, it is not feasible to get 
urban measures for many of the variables used in the test equations. 
On the other hand, the bias is not large for some variables. For 
example, FDI is mainly located in urban regions, and all state-owned 
enterprises are also located in the urban areas. Moreover, urbanization 
is the ideal variable because I wanted to test how urbanization itself 
affects income inequality. Government expenditure on agriculture is 
also ideal in capturing its contribution to the urban-rural income gap.
The urban Gini coefficient is calculated based on the reported 
grouped data of urban household income. These survey data are 
available from various issues of provincial statistical yearbooks. While 
most provinces divide households by seven groups, it is divided by 8 or 
5 groups in some provinces. For those provinces which divide 
households by 8 groups, I neglected the last 8th groups (the highest 
income group) to reduce inter-provincial bias. The urban-rural income 
gap is defined as urban-rural per capita income ratio after deflating 
urban and rural incomes by regional urban and rural CPIs respectively.
V. Empirical Results
Tables 6 and 7 report the empirical results for urban inequality and 
the urban-rural income gap, respectively. Actually, I ran the OLS, FE, 
RE, and system GMM models but the OLS results are not reported 
4
There are totally 31 provinces or municipalities in China. Among the 31 
members, 5 provinces of Hebei, Jilin, Hubei, Hunan, Gansu, and Tibet were 
excluded from the analysis because of the lack of related data for some years. 
Chongqing was included in Sichuan province before 1997, and it became a 
municipality since then. In this paper, I put Chongqing in Sichuan province for 
the convenience of analysis.
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF FDI 327
because all the explanatory variables are shown to be statistically 
significant in OLS model. 
In the FE, RE, and GMM models, I relied more on FE model for two 
reasons: (1) the Sargan/Hansen tests are weak because too many 
instruments are used as I mentioned in Section 4 and (2) the FE 
model is preferred to RE model because the Hausman-Wu test favors 
FE model in all specifications as we see below.
A. The Urban Gini Coefficient
Table 6 exhibits the regression results of the urban Gini. The overall 
results are encouraging, with more than 70% of the variation in the 
urban Gini coefficient explained by the independent variables. The R2 
reported for FE and RE models are R
2 within, it measures to what 
extent the difference in the urban Gini and the provincial mean can be 
explained by independent variables. The F-statistic is significant at 1% 
level and the signs of the coefficients are basically expected.
In Model (2), I used the ratio of the flows of FDI to GDP instead of 
ratio of the stocks of FDI to GDP to test the robustness of the FDI. In 
Model (3), export, another aspect of globalization, is included to 
capture the role of export and also to test robustness of FDI. In all 
models, the Hausman-Wu test favors the FE model. 
The results of FDI, government spending, and education are robust. 
Provinces with higher FDI ratio had larger urban Gini coefficients. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that an increase in FDI is associated 
with an increase of the Gini by 0.4 to 1.1. 
Provinces with more government consumption had greater urban 
inequality. This result is consistent with the result of Xu and Zou 
(2000) who find that income redistribution through government 
spending tends to shift resources from the rich and the poor to the 
middle class. Basically, government policy should lean toward the 
reduction of inequality. However, the results indicate that government’s 
policies may be leaning towards the elites or the middle class, rather 
than the poor class. The unfavorable treatment by the central 
government for the poor on medical service is actually an example of 
the policy distortion. In China, basic medical service started in 1952 is 
guaranteed only for those who work in the state sector while the 
unemployed or workers in informal sectors do not have access to the 
basic medical care. Also, the quality of the service varies between 
geographic regions, industries or entities.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS328
TABLE 6
DETERMINANTS OF THE URBAN GINI









FE RE GMM FE RE GMM FE RE GMM
FDI
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.005
(7.04)*** (9.51)*** (5.73)*** (4.64)*** (4.31)*** (2.32)** (7.04)*** (9.36)*** (5.86)***
GDPGR
　 
0.006 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.003
(4.49)*** (4.78)*** (1.86)* (2.57)** (2.64)*** (1.06) (4.49)*** (4.77)*** (1.40)
COAST
　 
(dropped) -0.306 -0.227 (dropped) -0.289 -0.121 (dropped) -0.323 -0.282
　 (-7.63)*** (-4.50)*** 　 (-6.56)*** (-1.58) 　 (-8.15)*** (-4.92)***
INFL
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 　-0.0002
(-1.04) (-1.50) (-0.62) (-3.39)*** (-3.96)*** (-2.67)** (-1.16) (-1.81)* (-0.13)
SOE
　 
-0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
(-1.73)* (-6.68)*** (-2.38)** (-3.29)*** (-9.14)*** (-1.40) (-1.30) (-5.10)*** (-1.97)*
GOV
　 
0.012 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012
(5.66)*** (6.11)*** (5.77)*** (4.06)*** (4.63)*** (5.13)*** (5.70)*** (6.26)*** (4.50)***
EDU
 
0.006 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.012
(7.11)*** (8.26)*** (5.76)*** (7.10)*** (8.47)*** (6.02)*** (7.03)*** (8.56)*** (5.67)***
URBAN
 
0.017 0.002 -0.002 0.021 0.003 -0.002 0.017 0.001 -0.001
(7.81)*** (2.03)** (-1.18) (9.33)*** (2.83)*** (-1.32) (7.21)*** (1.30) (-1.01)
EXPORT
 
　 　 　 　 　 　 0.001 0.002 0.001
　 　 　 　 　 　 (0.85) (2.01)** (0.82)
_CONS
 
-2.584 -1.755 -2.310 -2.243 -1.284 -2.078 -2.622 -1.835 -2.354
(-13.01)*** (-10.56)*** (-9.45)*** (-11.04)*** (-7.12)*** (-6.76)*** (-12.89)*** (-10.8)*** (-8.32)***
R2 0.750 0.720 　 0.733 0.688 　 0.750 0.721 
Obs.　 425 425 425 425 425 　 425 425 425
Hausman 0.000 　    0.000 　 　    0.000  
Sargan test 　 　 0.000 　 　 0.000 　 　 0.000
Hansen test 　 　 1.000 　 　 1.000 　 　 1.000 
AR(2) test 　 　 0.135 　 　 0.113 　 　 0.161
Notes: 1) In parentheses are t-values.
2) Test values reported for Hausman, Sargan, Hansen, and AR(2) are p-values.
3) R
2
 reported for FE and RE are R
2
 within. 
4) *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
5) See the appendix for the definitions of the variables.
Interestingly, provinces with higher educational levels had higher 
Gini coefficients. It is generally known that the spread of education 
reduces income inequality. However, this and other studies such as 
that of Xu and Zou (2000) found the opposite. The positive education- 
inequality relationship may imply that there exists a vicious circle 
between education and inequality. On one hand, it seems that more 
than ever, the emerging labor market encourages workers’ incomes to 
be determined more on the basis of their working ability and skills. 
Inequality may thus increase among individuals with different abilities. 
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On the other hand, high inequality enables the rich to obtain 
education first when tuition fee is high relative to income as observed 
by Perotti (1992). In China, education, together with housing prices 
and medical costs, is exceedingly expensive and is a big burden for the 
average household. This in turn worsens the already uneven income 
distribution. From this perspective, the positive interaction between 
education and inequality is understandable. To facilitate education and 
realize education equity, the Chinese government spread the free nine- 
year compulsory education to urban children starting from September 1, 
2008. This is an epoch-making event because educational equality 
should be at the top of social justice system.
Using the preferred FE model, economic growth, privatization (or the 
size of the state), and urbanization probably increased urban inequality 
although they lost significance in some GMM specifications. The 
positive sign of growth means that while the total pie of the economy is 
growing, it is shared disproportionally among the citizens. It favored 
the rich more than the poor. The role of privatization in rising income 
inequality is well explained in the study of Xu and Zou (2000). 
According to them, the rich in the urban sector will become richer 
through their investment in the private sector. The poor will remain 
poor as the employees of the state sector if they lack political clout and 
access to credit markets. The powerful, even without sufficient initial 
resources, may gain power and wealth as a result of their access to 
credit and profitable, money-making opportunities. 
The impact of urbanization on urban inequality is also clear. With 
the process of urbanization, more rural people are migrating from the 
rural sector to the urban sector. Because most of the migrants are 
unskilled, poor peasants with low abilities, they earn a lower wage in 
the informal sector than citizens or townsmen in the formal sector. 
Consequently, they become the new poor of the urban sector, and 
widen urban income disparity.
Inflation rate is shown to be significant only in Model (2). In Models 
(1) and (3), the sign remains negative, but becomes insignificant. 
Actually, inflation rate was very high during the early period, but has 
decreased significantly since 1997, so the impact of inflation on the 
urban poor has also decreased. As a result, inflation did not change 
urban income distribution much. The test results of model (3) show 
that there is no significant impact of export on urban inequality. This 
result is inconsistent with the studies finding export increases 
inequality in China (e.g., Wan et al. 2007).
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Finally, geography affects urban inequality and is quite significant 
except in the GMM specification of Model (2). It seems that provinces 
located in coastal region had smaller inequality. 
B. The Urban-rural Income Gap
Table 7 shows the regression results of the determinants of the 
urban-rural income gap. The signs of the coefficients are also basically 
expected but the R
2 reported are relatively low with about 40% of the 
variation in the urban-rural income gap is explained by the independent 
variables. Here, the Hausman-Wu test also favors FE estimates in all 
models.
As shown in this table, geography is negatively and significantly 
associated with the inequality between urban and rural sectors. Thus, 
provinces farther from the coast had larger urban-rural income inequal- 
ity. This result is consistent with the study of Li and Yue (2004).
Factors such as growth, inflation, privatization, and education in- 
creased the income gap between urban and rural areas, while govern- 
ment expenditure on agriculture reduced the gap. These variables are 
highly significant at the 1% level except in GMM specifications. The 
statistically positive sign of growth indicates that the rapid economic 
performance is not evenly shared between urban and rural residents. It 
helped the urban rich and harmed the rural poor. The role of the state 
is also highly significant, implying the above theory again. The rich will 
become richer through their investment in the private sector; the 
powerful, even without sufficient initial resources, may gain power and 
riches as a result of their access to credit and profitable, money- 
making opportunities; and the poor will remain poor if they lack 
political clout and access to credit markets (Xu and Zou 2000). 
Because the initial rich and the powerful are mainly urban residents, 
and most of the poor are powerless, poor peasants, the privatization 
process widened the income gap between urban and rural sectors. 
Inflation rate also worsened the urban-rural income gap. In fact, the 
assets of the urban residents are more diversified, whereas the poor 
peasants depend mainly on farm products. In China, grain prices have 
been fixed at a low level for a long period. This resulted in a slow 
growth of peasants’ income and a widening gap between urban and 
rural residents. 
The impact of education on the increasing urban-rural income gap is 
the result of increasing differentials in returns to education. On the 
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TABLE 7
DETERMINANTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL INCOME GAP 







　 FE RE GMM FE RE GMM FE RE GMM
FDI -0.001 0.001 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.016 -0.001 0.002 0.008
　 (-0.69) (0.89) (3.44)*** (0.76) (0.96) (0.63) (-0.69) (1.24) (3.14)***
GDPGR 0.012 0.014 0.002 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.005
　 (3.61)*** (3.68)*** (0.09) (3.58)*** (3.36)*** (0.45) (3.60)*** (3.64)*** (0.37)
COAST (dropped) -1.212 -1.732 (dropped) -1.225 -1.011 (dropped) -1.215 -1.083
　 　 (-7.30)*** (-3.52)*** 　 (-7.29)*** (-2.32)** 　 (-7.94)*** (-5.01)***
INFL 0.010 0.009 0.019 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.008 -0.011
　 (4.51)*** (3.70)*** (2.51)** (4.26)*** (3.25)*** (0.07) (4.57)*** (3.29)*** (-0.95)
SOE -0.022 -0.022 -0.016 -0.022 -0.023 -0.012 -0.023 -0.021 0.005 
　 (-6.88)*** (-7.46)*** (-1.82)* (-6.85)*** (-7.96)*** (-1.17) (-6.67)*** (-6.08)*** (0.53)
AGR -0.048 -0.040 -0.051 -0.047 -0.040 -0.066 -0.047 -0.039 0.001
　 (-4.69)*** (-3.74)*** (-1.52) (-4.63)*** (-3.68)*** (-1.73)* (-4.66)*** (-3.47)*** (0.02)
EDU 0.008 0.008 -0.004 0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.007 0.008 -0.001
　 (3.29)*** (3.13)*** (-0.38) (3.06)*** (3.14)*** (-0.19) (2.91)*** (3.03)*** (-0.07)
URBAN 0.002 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 -0.007 -0.016 0.003 -0.010 -0.012
　 (0.27) (-1.92)* (-1.54) (0.19) (-1.76)* (-2.00)* (0.48) (-2.41)** (-1.46)
EXPORT 　 　 　 　 　 -0.002 0.002 0.008
　 　 　 　 　 　 (-0.77) (0.58) (1.48)
_CONS 2.670 3.446 3.232 2.696 3.580 4.819 2.746 3.368 4.027
　 (5.86)*** (7.85)*** (2.35)** (5.88)*** (8.05)*** (2.73)** (5.89)*** (7.32)*** (1.54)
R
2 0.417 0.409 0.417 0.412 　 0.418 0.404
Obs. 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 　425
Hausman 0.000 　 0.000 0.000
Sargan test 　 　 0.000 　 　 0.000 　 　 0.000 
Hansen test 　 　 1.000 　 　 1.000 　 　 1.000 
AR(2) test 0.103 0.137 0.112
Notes: 1) In parentheses are t-values.
 2) Test values reported for Hausman, Sargan, Hansen, and AR(2) are p-values.
 3) R
2
 reported for FE and RE are R
2
 within. 
 4) *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
 5) See the appendix for the definitions of the variables.
other hand, fiscal expenditure on agriculture is also significant as 
expected, implying that input in agriculture could help reduce the 
income gap between urban and rural sectors.
More importantly, both aspects of globalization, FDI and export, were 
found to be insignificant. Why does FDI not contribute significantly to 
the increasing urban-rural income gap in contrast with its impact on 
urban inequality? As is known, FDI is mainly distributed in the coastal 
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regions. The problem is that the income gap between urban and rural 
sectors is more severe in inland regions but not in the coastal regions. 
From this perspective, it is understandable that FDI may not play a 
significant impact on the urban-rural income gap. The impact of export 
on the urban-rural income gap can also be explained in this way. 
Finally, urbanization, measured by the share of nonagricultural 
population in the total provincial population, had no significant impact 
on the income gap between urban and rural areas. Essentially, 
urbanization is a cure for the income gap between urban and rural 
areas, as Chang (2002) argued “... a cure for this problem is to 
accelerate urbanization in the short run and to promote the growth of 
the urban sector in the long run. Yet, these policies in the short run 
may further widen the measured income gap.” 
However, the pace of urbanization is slow in China because of the 
faster growth of the rural population than urban population. There are 
also many restrictions on migration from the rural to urban region. 
Moreover, the urban sector may not be able to absorb the large rural 
surplus workers. Therefore, the impact of urbanization on the urban- 
rural income disparity is not strong.
VI. Conclusions and Discussions
When China launched its open door policy in 1978, China also 
opened its door to the world economy to acquire access to advanced 
technology and solve the problem of capital shortage. Since then, FDI 
has continuously flowed into China. China is now the second largest 
recipient of FDI only next to the United States. With the increase of 
FDI inflows into China, the debate on the impact of FDI on Chinese 
economy has been heated among scholars. However, studies on the 
effect of FDI are mainly focused on its growth effect, and only few 
studies investigated the distributional effect of FDI.
This paper has examined the impact of FDI on China’s income 
inequality not only within the urban areas but also between the urban 
and rural sectors. Using a set of Chinese provincial data covering 25 
provinces over the period of 1990-2006, and applying fixed effects, 
random effects as well as system GMM techniques, this paper suggests 
the following:
First, factors relating to the economic growth such as FDI, education, 
privatization, urbanization, as well as economic growth itself have 
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positive contributions to the rising income inequality in urban China. 
The statistically significant impact of FDI on increasing urban inequality 
is robust in all the models employed. These reflect the penetration of 
the market mechanism into the Chinese economy, which was induced 
by the reform policy. Intriguingly, government spending also increased 
urban inequality, and thus implying the possibility of policy distortion.
Second, FDI provides no evidence on the widening urban-rural income 
gap. The income gap between the urban and rural areas increased with 
higher growth and inflation rates, higher educational level, and the 
reduction of SOE share. It is also found that the gap decreased with 
increasing fiscal expenditure on agriculture. 
Third, export exerts no significant impact either on the urban 
inequality or the urban-rural income gap.
Fourth, provinces farther from the coast not only experienced more 
uneven income inequality within the urban areas but also experienced 
more severe income gap between urban and rural sectors. 
The empirical results of this paper do provide some evidence for a 
positive correlation between FDI and inequality in post reform China. 
Accordingly, my findings are generally consistent with the argument of 
the dependency theorists. However, the distributional impact of FDI 
may differ by the difference in the time horizon considered. That 
means that it is possible that the statistically significantly positive 
correlation between FDI and inequality obtained in previous studies 
and this study (in urban sector) could diminish or reverse over 
significantly longer periods as the modernization theorists argue. Once 
a certain level of development is reached with relatively high income 
and technological level, the wage premium on skilled labor due to 
skill-biased technology brought in by foreign companies decreases. 
Because nowadays China is possibly under the ‘certain level,’ it is 
difficult to simply conclude which theory is right.
Nevertheless, it is important that we understand the impact of FDI 
on income inequality, so that we can minimize the negative effect, and 
maximize the benefits associated with FDI. As some scholars argue, 
FDI provides China with capital and technology, propagate better 
management practices, raises labor productivity and promotes economic 
growth (though debatable). But the government usually offers more 
incentives to high-tech FDI in differentiated sectors, which will increase 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. One policy 
implication is that elimination of special treatment of FDI in those sectors 
will help reduce the negative impact on income distribution.
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Another policy implication that can be drawn from the analysis of 
this paper is that the government should invest more in public 
education and thus narrow skills gap among citizens, because FDI 
increases differentials in returns to education and skills. From this 
perspective, education is a key to solving income inequality. At the 
same time, however, a larger skill premium is likely to induce faster 
increase in private investment in education in China. Then the balance 
between public and private education will emerge as another problem 
and it is beyond the scope of this paper.
(Received 23 February 2009; Revised 27 April 2009)
Data Appendix
Empirical estimations of the paper are based on annual data 
covering 25 provinces over the period of 1990-2006. Data sources are 
from various years of China Statistical Yearbook, China Population 
Statistical Yearbook, provincial statistical yearbooks, and China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics. Variables used for estimations are listed 
below. 
(1) GINI＝the urban Gini coefficient. Provincial statistical yearbooks 
report basic condition of urban and rural households by income 
percentiles of households.
(2) URGAP＝urban-rural income gap. It is defined as the ratio of 
urban disposable income to rural net income per capita.
(3) GDPGR＝the real growth rate of GDP per capita, measured at 
constant price level.
(4) FDI＝the ratio of FDI stocks to provincial GDP.
(5) COAST＝a dummy variable. It takes on a value of 1 for 10 
provinces or municipalities located in the coastal areas, and takes on a 
value of 0 for 15 inland provinces. 10 coastal provinces or municipalities 
include Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. Inland provinces refer to Shanxi, 
Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Guangxi, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. 
(6) EDU＝secondary school enrollment rate.
(7) INFL＝the inflation rate measured by CPI.
(8) SOE＝the size of state sector, measured as the proportion of 
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workers and staff in state-owned entities in the total.
(9) EXPORT＝the share of the volume of exports in provincial GDP.
(10) GOV＝public spending over provincial GDP.
(11) AGR＝the proportion of provincial fiscal expenditure on agricul- 
ture.
(12) URBAN＝urbanization measured by the proportion of non- 
agricultural population in the total provincial population.
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